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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, three areas are described:

the phenomenon of body

dissatisfaction among apparently normal-sized women from a sociocultural
perspective; social comparison theory, which is proposed to be the mechanism
by which the phenomenon operates; and the results of an experiment designed
not only to test the nature of the phenomenon itself, but also to test certain
components of social comparison theory, such as selection of comparison
targets and the role of derogation.
The study reports women’s responses to inescapable social comparison
on the attribute of body size and shape with two groups of social comparison
targets: photographs from popular magazines of (1) thin female models and (2)
heavy female models.

Thus, examined was a single episode of social

comparison with media targets on a single salient dimension-body size and
shape.
The hypotheses tested were:

(1) women who engage in inescapable

social comparison with heavy models will show less decrease in body esteem
or mood and less incidence of reporting a feared fat self than will the women
who view thin models, and (2) women engaging in inescapable social
comparison with thin models may manage that potential threat to their body
esteem or well-being by derogating the thin models on perceived traits more
than will those women comparing with the heavy models.
The experiment succeeded in operationally testing both hypotheses. The

independent variables were

heavy versus thin comparison targets and

opportunity versus no opportunity for explicit derogation.

The comparison

targets differed significantly on body size, but not on attractiveness. The four
main dependent variables (body esteem, mood, possible selves, and derogation)
were found to have adequate reliabilities and some were from known, validated
instruments.
The hypotheses were not supported, although one mood factor, anxiety,
was negatively correlated with having an opportunity to derogate (p. = .03).
However,

the

reliability measure for this mood factor was

(Chronbach’s Alpha = .47).

rather low

The role of media consumption is discussed in

relation to social comparison processes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Melissa Farley, a University of Iowa psychologist, used the famed
cB.arbia::doll, whose human proportions would be 39-24-31, as
evHence that girls are raised with expectations.forjjiejLbjQdiesJthat
at@Jmp.ossibJe-io^Qhi^e7(‘Breast obsession," 1986)
Throughout my adolescence and adulthood, I have heard girls and women
lament over their bodies; I have heard them despise their shapes and vow to
begin one program or another to change their bodies.

I have heard

prepubescent girls describe the diets they are on or the technique of vomiting
after eating to prevent weight gain. I have seen average-sized girls and women
turn themselves into painfully thin dieters, and continue to diet. I have seen
"failed" dieters detest themselves for not reaching their goal.

I have seen

teen-age ballet students using amphetamines to prevent their hunger from
causing them to eat.
To what standard of slimness are these people adhering? What has
happened to their powers of perception that they can’t see that they have
already arrived at an adequate level of leanness? Why do so many girls and
women obsess about their body size and loathe their own physical selves,
"pursu[ing] thinness like a career" (Rodin, Silberstein, & Striegel-Moore, 1985, p.
269). In this study, I will first examine where and how this phenomenon of body
dissatisfaction among apparently normal-sized women might have originated,

2
that is, a sociocultural perspective of the phenomenon. Second, I will discuss
in detail social comparison theory, which I propose to be the mechanism by
which the phenomenon operates.

Finally, I will describe the results of an

experiment designed not only to test the nature of the phenomenon itself (e.g.,
Is body satisfaction modifiable? What individual differences account for more or
less body satisfaction?), but also to test certain components of social
comparison theory, such as selection of comparison targets and the role of
derogation.
Sociocultural Influences
In order to establish a position for sociocultural influences on the
phenomenon of women’s dissatisfaction with their bodies, I will state and
support a series of propositions: (1) Women care about appearing attractive; (2)
body size and shape are important features of attractiveness; (3) women
evaluate the size and shape of their bodies by comparing them with the ideal
body; (4) the ideal body is presented in the media by professional models and
actresses, the "ideals"; (5) the ideals represent a biased distribution of body size
and shape, in the direction of extreme thinness; (6) the media emphasize the
thinness of the ideals with explicit verbal messages exhorting women to lose
weight and/or become smaller; (7) the majority of women comparing their
bodies with the extremely thin ideals will inevitably evaluate their own bodies as
bigger or heavier; (8) this evaluation leads most women to feel dissatisfied with
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the size and shape of their bodies.
The initial premise is that women care about their appearance, their
attractiveness. There is empirical evidence that suggests that women place
great attention on their appearance. Rand and Hall (1983) found that women
were significantly accurate at assessing their own attractiveness, using judges’
ratings as the criterion, whereas men were not; they also found that the
correlations between the overall attractiveness self-ratings and the judges’
ratings were significantly different between male and female subjects.

The

self-ratings by male and female subjects had very similar means and variances;
therefore, the differences between the correlations for male and female subjects
were not an artifact of lower variances in the males' self-ratings.

In another

study, Psychology Today conducted a body image survey among its readership
(Cash, Winstead, & Janda, 1986). One of the subscales concerned appearance
orientation of the respondents, and only 7% of the women in the response
sample indicated that they have little or no concern about their appearance and
don’t do much to improve it, leaving, of course, 93% who do care (this survey
was a Likert-type agree/disagree instrument). Striegel-Moore, Silberstein, and
Rodin (1986) contend that girls learn from an early age and from diverse
socialization agents that they should be especially concerned with their
appearance because it is particularly important to them as girls; being attractive
is an implicit part of pleasing and serving others and will secure the love of
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others. Lakoff and Scherr (1984) discuss beauty in terms of the power that it
gives women to trade for other things they seek: wealth, security, love. They
maintain that by possessing beauty, which is itself useless, women have
something that others want or need, and, thus, women have power (albeit an
uneasy power that dissipates with time).
The size and shape of a woman’s body is an essential aspect of her
overall attractiveness. Franzoi and Herzog (1987) had college students rate
different body parts for their importance in determining same-sex and
opposite-sex attractiveness. The female attractiveness dimension of both male
and female judges was significantly dominated by items that had to do with body
size and shape:

waist, thighs, body build, buttocks, hips, legs, figure or

physique, appearance of stomach, and weight. The researchers concluded that
a woman’s weight is a key aspect in evaluations of her overall attractiveness.
Another study used photographs of women’s faces and bodies (at three levels
of attractiveness each) factorially combined to determine the role of faces and
bodies in judgments of physical attractiveness (Alicke, Smith, & Klotz, 1986).
The investigators found two very strong main effects:

face and body each

contributed significantly to ratings of overall attractiveness. They also found a
small but significant face-body interaction: ratings of overall attractiveness for
a low-attractive body were low at all three levels of facial attractiveness, but
ratings for a medium- or high-attractive body at the three ascending
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attractiveness levels for face rose proportionately to the face-only ratings. Thus,
although face and body contributed independently to ratings of overall physical
attractiveness, the presence of a low-attractive body disproportionately lowered
the ratings for a high-attractive face.
How do women evaluate their bodies to assess their own attractiveness?
No objective yardstick for beayty . exists,™ so women must use either an
internally-generated standard or an externally-generate

If most women

used internally-generated standards for body attractiveness, it is unlikely that
there would be high consensus for an "ideal" shape or size within a culture, for
individuals would generate their own unique conception of the ideal, and we
could expect to see a greater distribution of body sizes considered attractive in
the culture. Yet in the U.S. a slim ideal very surely prevails. Perhaps this slim
ideal is a universal human preference? Not so. Other cultures and historical
periods have admired female bodies that are much fatter than the current
American ideal; one has only to look at the female models that Rubens in the
seventeenth century and Renoir in the nineteenth century used in such paintings
as "The Garden of Love" and "The Judgment of Paris" (subjects dealing explicitly
with physical beauty) to see women who were ideals of their day and who are
unattractively fat by our standards (Janson, 1971). In this culture, there is a
great deal of stigma attached to being a fat woman. An example of that stigma
is evident in the title of the journal that published an article called "The Fat
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Admirer," (Goode & Preissler, 1983) which describes some of the members of
the National Association to Aid Fat Americans, predominantly average-sized men
who are attracted to heavy women; this article was published

in the

interdisciplinary journal Deviant Behavior. Internally-generated standards of
beauty would override such social stigma, if they were being used.
Evidently, an externally-generated standard exists and is then internalized
by women. Measurement against this standard may occur through the use of
social feedback, in which case a woman would evaluate her body by inferring
others’ evaluations of it through their speech and behavior (Wegner & Vallacher,
1977). Advertisers and proponents of the fitness business currently in mode
certainly send messages to women to slim down and firm up, so it is possible
that those women dissatisfied with their bodies are taking those public
messages personally to evaluate their figures. On the other hand, some of the
women discontented with their bodies are those that have already reached
reasonable levels of fitness and leanness and thus probably receive frequent
personal, face- to-face messages from men and women that they are physically
attractive. Somehow these messages are not being heeded. Women seem not
to hear, or accept, the message about which body size men find attractive. This
conclusion is supported in a study by Fallon and Rozin (1985), who had male
and female undergraduates indicate which of nine male and female figure
drawings ranging from fat to thin was the figure most attractive to the opposite
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sex and which was the opposite sex figure that they found the most attractive.
The women erred in determining the figure most attractive to the opposite sex;
women thought that men prefer a thinner female figure than the men actually
indicated (the men also erred, thinking women prefer a heavier male figure than
the women actually indicated).

If social feedback were in operation for such

judgments, women would be more likely to identify accurately the figure size that
men report they prefer.
If social feedback is not the primary mechanism for self-evaluation, then
what is? I posit that social comparison is the primary mechanism. That is,
women evaluate their own bodies by comparing them to other women’s bodies.
I will discuss social comparison theory in detail below after describing the
sociocultural influences on women’s body dissatisfaction, but for now, suffice
it to say that social comparison is the use of social reality (as opposed to
physical reality) to evaluate one’s own abilities or opinions. However, at this
point there exists an inconsistency; body sizes among women are normally
distributed within age groups ( 1979 Build and Blood Pressure Study. 1980), so
the average woman engaging in social comparison with women her own age is
most likely to see around her many bodies rather like her own, plus some
heavier and some thinner; and of course the thinner the woman doing the
comparing, the more women she will see with heavier bodies.

Such a

comparison result, regularly found, ought to lead to body satisfaction. Yet the

8
average woman these days is bemoaning her "fat" body and rejecting
compliments about her attractive figure.

Compared to whom does the

average-sized woman look fat? The answer is, compared to the representations
of the ideal found in the media, the slender women who make their livings as
models of beauty. Perhaps women are using the women appearing in the media
as their social comparison targets and not using the women around them in the
population.
There is evidence to support the notion that some adults construct their
world-views in large part based on the view that the media give them, and the
view from the television screen is often skewed. Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and
Signorielli (1986) maintain that it is not necessary to be a "heavy" (frequent)
viewer in order to be influenced by television’s "cultivation" effects, because the
messages are stable, the medium is ubiquitous, and what counts in the end is
accumulated total exposure, not average daily viewing (however, they do make
comparisons between heavy and light viewers, in the absence of non-viewers,
who are nearly non-existent). These researchers report that the prime-time world
is inhabited by 300 major characters who conduct lives that are in appearance
conventional and normal, but are in fact quite unlike the real world. An example
of one of the cultivation effects is the finding that television under-represents
older people (representing people over 65 only one-fifth of their actual
occurrence in the U.S. population), and that heavy viewers are more likely than
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light viewers to feel that, compared to 20 years ago, the elderly have decreased
in number, are in poorer health, and don’t live as long, all perceptions that are
contrary to fact (Gerbner et al., 1986). Another example of a cultivation effect
of television is in the perception of how violent the world is. According to
Gerbner et al., half of television’s prime time major characters are involved in
violent action each week, yet in the actual U.S. population, fewer than 1% of the
people are victims of violent actions; accordingly, heavy viewers believe that
more violence exists in the world than light viewers do.
Perhaps the extreme slenderness of most female major television
characters has created another cultivation effect:

women (and men) might

believe that there are more slender women in the population than there actually
are. Silverstein, Perdue, Peterson, and Kelly (1986) investigated the body size
of 221 male and female adult characters in highly-rated (Nielsen National Index)
weekly television shows. They reported that 69.1% of the female characters
were rated as thin, whereas only 17.5% of the male characters were; only 5% of
the female but 25.5% of the male characters were rated as heavy.

The

researchers tested for the possibility that the sex difference in body size was
due to age differences (e.g., young female characters and old male characters),
but found that it was not. Thus, the majority of the female characters appearing
on television are thin, and a very small minority of them are fat, a distribution of
body size very unlike that found in the naturally-occurring female population;
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furthermore, that particular biased representation relative to the population
distribution does not exist for male television characters, so not everybody is
thin on television, just most of the women.
In today’s magazines the ideal female bodies that appear are slimmer than
ever before.

Garner, Garfinkel, Schwartz, and Thompson (1980) collected

self-report measurements from Playboy centerfold models from 1959 to 1979 and
compared the yearly mean weights with actual population norms from 1959 and
1979 Society of Actuaries "Build and Blood Pressure Studies." Not only were the
centerfold mean weights statistically significantly less than those of the
population, but also the centerfold means decreased significantly over the
period, while the population means increased significantly between 1959 and
1979 for all heights and ages under 30. The researchers then calculated the
percent of average weight for each model by converting each model’s weight
into a percent of the expected weight based upon the Society of Actuaries 1959
norms.

Because heights of the centerfold models were increasing, absolute

weight did not decline, but percent of average weight did, dropping from 91%
in 1959 to 83.5% in 1978. In another study, researchers sampled photographs
of women from Ladies Home Journal and Vogue and calculated bust-to-waist
ratios (equivalent to hip-to-waist ratios) from the beginning of the century to
1981 (Silverstein et al., 1986). They found a decreasing nonmonotonic trend in
both magazines, dropping from a high of 2.0 (combined averages) in 1901 to a
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low of 1.1 in 1925, then climbing to 1.6 in 1949, finally dropping to 1.3 in 1965,
where it has remained steadily ever since. The researchers reported similar
findings from their calculations of bust-to-waist ratios of popular actresses from
1933 to 1979. They point out that 30-year-old women have been exposed to that
"noncurvaceous standard" (i.e., extremely thin standard) since their early
adolescence.

Thus, the women of the baby boom and those younger have

watched their bodies begin moving away from the current ideal when they
entered pubescence and went from having 10% to 15% more body fat than boys
to having almost twice as much fat as boys (Striegel-Moore et al., 1986). The
boyish or "prepubertal" look of the ideal is extremely difficult to maintain past
adolescence unless it is part of an individual’s genetic inheritance.
Garner et al. (1980) examined the bodies of the contestants appearing in
that most overt televised display of the feminine ideal, the Miss America
Pageant, from 1959 through 1978.

They calculated the percent of average

weight for each contestant using the Society of Actuaries 1959 norms, as
described above; they then correlated the change in percent of average weight
with the passage of time (years). They found that during that 20-year period, the
percent of average weight for all contestants decreased (r = -.83), reflecting an
average decline in weight of 0.13 kg (0.28 lb) per year. Furthermore, for pageant
winners, the percent of average weight decreased (r -

-.62), reflecting an

average decline in weight of 0.17 kg (0.37 lb) per year. Finally, the researchers
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report that since 1970, the winners have weighed significantly less than the other
contestants of that year.
The ideal women portrayed in magazines are in fact the results of hours
and hours of collaborative effort on the parts of hair and clothing stylists,
make-up artists, photographers, and in some cases photographic retouchers.
"’I am an optical illusion,5 says supermodel Clotilde referring to her magical
transformation into the natural-looking beauty whom we have come to know in
Ralph Lauren ads" (Lakoff & Scherr, 1984, p. 111). The woman living in her own
body 24 hours a day will never measure up to the perfection living in the pages
of magazines. "’You create an illusion,3 says well-known fashion model Janice
Dickinson, ’I have no breasts but by holding my body in a certain way I can
create a cleavage. You can create cheekbones or take a bump on your nose
and make it disappear with makeup’" (Lakoff & Scherr, p. 111). Unlike painted
figures of the feminine ideal, which could be argued to be the artist’s fantasy,
models on television and in magazines may be perceived to be realistic.
Lest female consumers of magazines not get the message that to be
beautiful is to be thin, advertisements and articles explicitly state the message.
Garner et al. (1980) calculated the frequency of articles concerning dieting for
weight loss for the period 1959-78, and found that the number of diet articles
has increased over those 20 years (r = .83). Silverstein et al. (1986) performed
a content analysis of women’s and men’s magazines and calculated the ratios
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of a number of different messages (the ratios are all women’s:men’s): ads for
diet foods, 63:1; body shape ads and articles, 96:12; total food ads, 1,179:15;
food articles, 228:10; and ads for alcoholic beverages, 19:624. An interesting
paradox emerges: women are exhorted to attend to their body shape carefully,
yet are also to study and gain expertise in food and food preparation. Women’s
magazines are not just more likely to carry more messages about comestibles;
men’s magazines carry far more messages about alcoholic beverages.
Evidently, this bombardment of messages, both visual and verbal, is
having its effect: women are comparing their bodies against a slender ideal.
Striegel-Moore et al. (1986) report that several studies document that physically
attractive women are perceived by men and women as more feminine, and that
the ectomorphic female silhouette is associated with perceived femininity.
People conceive of their own physical selves with a "body image", which literally
refers to the body as a psychological experience and focuses on the individual’s
subjective experiences with her or his own body and on the individual’s manner
of organizing those experiences (McCrea, Summerfield, & Rosen, 1982). Thus
people carry two images: the ideal body image and their own body image.
"Women measure themselves against the ideal, and most emerge from such
comparisons with discrepancies that are viewed as flaws and causes for
self-criticism" (Striegel-Moore et al., p. 251).
That women are viewing themselves as flawed (i.e., too big) is supported
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by a number of studies. Sixty-five million American adults diet, and two-thirds
of them are women (Schlosberg, 1987). Eighty-three percent of men are pleased
with their physical appearance, but only 61% of women are pleased with theirs
("Demomemo," 1987). Several studies report that most of their female subjects
consider themselves "too fat." A Glamour body image survey ("Feeling fat," 1984)
found 75% of its respondents feel too fat. A Psychology Today body image
survey (Cash et al., 1986) found that, of women who were actually underweight,
40% classified themselves as normal-weight and 4% as overweight; and, of
women who were actually normal-weight, 47% classified themselves as
overweight.

Fallon

and

Rozin

(1985)

had

undergraduates

respond

to

questionnaires and figure drawings ranging ordinally from thin to heavy; 69.7%
of the women indicated that their current size was larger than their ideal size,
and 62.4% indicated that their current size was larger than the size most
attractive to men (for the male respondents, their own current size and ideal size
were almost identical). Gray (1977) had undergraduates respond to questions
about their weight and appearance, and among those who misperceived their
weight-related appearance, women were more likely to perceive themselves as
overweight than were men. Finally, Harris (1983) found that women were more
likely to call themselves overweight and to say they weigh more than their ideal
weight than were men.
I have asserted that women care about their body sizes and compare
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them to the bodies of women in the media, who represent a biased distribution
of body sizes (most extremely slender) and whose representations are
accompanied by explicit encouragement to become thin. I have also stated that
the inevitable result for the majority of women comparing with media ideals is
an evaluation of their own bodies as too big or too fat. At this point, I will
examine in detail social comparison theory by addressing several areas: a brief
history of the theory, attributional aspects of social comparison, evaluation
versus enhancement of the self, choice of comparison targets, and the role of
derogation in social comparison.
Social Comparison Theory
Festinger (1954) postulated that humans have a drive to evaluate their
own opinions and abilities, thereby creating the accurate self-appraisal
necessary for adaptive behavior. When there are no objective standards against
which one’s abilities and opinions can be measured to assess one’s competence
or correctness, subjective standards must be used. Such standards exist in the
social environment, and assessments are the result of comparisons with
appropriate others, that is, those similar on relevant attributes or on the focal
attribute itself (Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982).
Attributional aspects of social comparison. Goethals and Darley (1977)
point out that abilities cannot be directly observed, but must be inferred from
performances and then must be attributed to the performers; therefore, there
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is always an attributional question about the role of nonability factors (e.g., luck,
difficulty of task) in inferring others’ abilities. Although opinions, or opinion
statements, are directly observable (they can be heard or read), they can be
determined by a multitude of factors (beliefs, values, likes, etc.) and can be
compared to make attributions about underlying characteristics such as
intelligence or values. Goethals and Darley cite Kelley’s 1973 summary of the
basic principles of attribution theory that are pertinent to making attributions for
others’ opinion statements and performances.

These basic principles are

covariation, discounting, and augmentation. Covariation of a response to a
possible cause includes distinctiveness (not all entities elicit the response),
consistency (the entity always elicits the response), and consensus (others react
to the entity in the same way).

Discounting refers to the existence of other

plausible causes for a response, such as luck during performance or personal
biases for uttering an opinion statement. Augmentation is the occurrence of
anything which suppresses the observed response, thereby giving more reason
to attribute the response to the entity.
Goethals and Darley (1977) discuss the ambiguity of some comparisons
when a "comparison other" is similar or dissimilar on attributes affecting
performance (when evaluating ability) and when the comparison other is similar
or dissimilar on attributes affecting beliefs or values (when evaluating opinion).
To evaluate an ability without ambiguity, say Goethals and Darley, an individual
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must select a comparison other whose performance-related attributes are similar
to the individual’s. To compare with a similar other means that discounting and
augmentation are not likely to play an important role in the attribution of ability.
For example, if a pianist wanted to evaluate her ability, she would likely get
ambiguous information by comparing with a dissimilar other. If the other were
relatively advantaged (e.g., he had had more years of practice), the likely
outcome of the comparison is that she will perform less well, but is that outcome
because her ability is lower or because of her disadvantage in a related
attribute? Similarly, if the other were relatively disadvantaged (e.g., he had had
fewer years of practice), the likely outcome of the comparison is that she will
perform better, but is that because her ability is greater or because of her
advantage over the other?
Opinions can be classified into beliefs and values; beliefs can be "correct"
or 'Verifiable" (such as believing that the weather in Nebraska is variable), and
values cannot (such as having the opinion that the weather in Nebraska is
unpleasant); many opinion statements are a combination of beliefs and values
(such as considering Bonnie Blair to be a superior speed-skater).
When considering comparison others for the evaluation of a belief, an
individual will learn little about the correctness of her or his belief if a similar
other agrees because the agreement may be a result of a non-entity
characteristic that they share and that is a function of their personal biases, not
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a function of the entity around which the belief is built; this is the discounting
principle. In contrast, if a similar other disagrees, the individual must become
less confident that her or his belief is entity-caused, because if the individual’s
belief about the entity does not covary with the entity across other people, the
individual cannot attribute the belief to the entity, but must consider that it is a
function of her or his own characteristics; this is the consensus portion of the
covariation principle. Considerably more information about the validity of the
individual’s beliefs is available if he or she compares with a dissimilar other and
that other agrees; in this case, there is consensus without the need to discount
potential biasing characteristics that the individual possesses. If the dissimilar
other disagrees with the individual’s belief, the individual can attribute this
disagreement to their differences, but will not learn much about the validity of
his or her belief.
When values are assessed through social comparison, there is likely to be
the most information when comparisons are made with similar others who agree;
in this case, one’s confidence in one’s own opinion is strengthened. If a similar
other disagrees, however, the individual will become less confident that the
value is entity-caused, as described above for beliefs; this is the consensus
problem. On the other hand, if a dissimilar other agrees, the individual learns
little about his or her own value because the dissimilarity is based upon
underlying attributes that are expected to go into the make-up of the value.
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Finally, if a dissimilar other disagrees, little information is gained, as this is the
predicted outcome of such a comparison anyway.
Evaluation versus enhancement of the self. Goethals and Darley (1977)
amend Festinger’s hypothesis that humans have a drive to evaluate their abilities
and opinions; they posit that humans have an evaluation drive, but that they also
have an enhancement drive. Thus, individuals engaging in social comparison
have a drive to be accurate plus a competing drive to find that their opinions are
correct/good and their abilities high. Obviously, when using social comparison
as the measuring stick, the choice of comparison others is the means by which
people satisfy both drives.
Choice of comparison other. Goethals and Darley were interested in
maximum information gain from social comparison when they considered the
attributions one makes when comparing with similar or dissimilar others, as
described in the preceding paragraphs; these choices of referents presume an
evaluation drive. However, there is evidence that individuals will defend their
self-esteem in some circumstances by engaging in social comparison with a
biased distribution of comparison targets, thus losing the potential for
maximizing information gain. For example, Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985)
interviewed

78

preponderance

breast
of

social

cancer

patients

comparisons

and

with

found

an

disadvantaged

overwhelming
others

(i.e.,

comparisons with other breast cancer patients who had more severe,
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debilitating, or distressing experiences with the disease).

The

patients

interviewed were selectively attending to those breast cancer patients who were
worse

off than

they;

their

comparisons were

thus

"downward"

social

comparisons. In this case, the women were comparing with others who were
dissimilar on the focal attribute itself (severity of the cancer or surgery and/or
problems in adjustment). They were not maximizing information gain through
comparison on ability of adjustment or recovery with similar others; instead, they
were protecting their self-esteem by "learning" that they were doing very well
indeed.
In contrast to these findings, Wheeler et al. (1982) report that when
experimental subjects were allowed to select comparison others on the basis of
their performance per se (the focal attribute itself), they tended to choose others
who were most similar in performance, yet slightly better (these comparisons
were on abilities, for which there is a unidirectional drive upward).

Such a

comparison is likely to yield accurate information about one’s own ability plus
some information about performances that are slightly (and attainably?) better.
Note that comparisons were rarely made with the standard-setters, those
performing at the top of the scale.

For selection of comparison others on

attributes related to ability, Wheeler et al. report that subjects tended to choose
others who were highly similar to them; the researchers reason that since related
attributes (e.g., practice time for skill at a task) help us foreordain conclusions,

comparing against others in the same "league" gives us the most meaningful
information. Finally, Miller (1982) found that female subjects used similarity of
physical attractiveness for selecting a comparison other even when that attribute
was explicitly not related to the focal attribute, test performance. She suggests
that this may be a result of physical attractiveness being a perpetually salient
attribute for selection of comparison others because it is integral to a person’s
social identity; alternatively she suggests that people may compare automatically
with others on dimensions they have used frequently in the past. In any case,
there seem to be a variety of strategies used for assessing ability: downward
comparison (in the case of the cancer patients faced with a threatening
circumstance) and comparison with others who are similar or just slightly better
(upward comparison) in performance. Gruder (1977) asserts that, in order to
find out not only how they stand, but also that their standing is admirable,
people want to learn about the standard-setters and thus be able to interpret all
the other standings on the dimension; he further suggests that this information
about the standard-setters may, after repeated experiences, be internalized and
turned into a cognitive standard.
The role of derogation in social comparison. Wills (1981) discusses
downward social comparison in depth and states his basic principle, "Persons
can increase their subjective well-being through comparison with a less fortunate
other," (p. 245), and several corollaries, two of which are, "Downward
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comparisons can occur on a passive basis in which persons take advantage of
available opportunities for comparison with a less fortunate other," and
"Downward comparison can be achieved through active derogation of another
person, thereby increasing the psychological distance between the self and the
other" (p. 245).
investigations

He supports the proposition about derogation by citing

of

"scapegoating,"

"displaced

aggressions,"

and

"hostility

generalization"; he says that two common elements are necessary for derogation
of a target person: (1) that subjects are presented with an ego threat and (2)
that subjects are given an opportunity to express their opinion of the target
person. Thus, an individual comparing with a more fortunate or a similar other
is apparently able to satisfy the self-enhancement drive by derogating the other
on attributes other than the focal attribute.
Social comparison on the attractiveness dimension. Attractiveness is
neither an ability nor an opinion; immediately and unavoidably perceived, it is a
moderately modifiable attribute that is socially determined and socially learned;
however, there is a unidirectional drive upward for attractiveness, just as there
is for ability. When women engage in social comparison on the dimension of
attractiveness,

are

they

satisfying

both

the

self-evaluation

and

the

self-enhancement drives? To accurately evaluate her body, a woman must learn
about the standard (What is the top of the scale?) and about her standing in the
distribution (What ranking do I hold?). For the first question, she must scrutinize

23
the standard-setters until she develops a mental picture of the ideal, a
prototype. Then, to answer the second question, she must scan others’ bodies
to assess where in the distribution she fits; it is reasonable to expect her to
compare with the population of others similar on related attributes (e.g., age,
race, social status). Very likely, if this comparison with similar others in the
population is occurring, it is being swamped by repeated and inescapable
upward comparisons with the ideals in the media. These frequent inescapable
comparisons might result in a lowering of subjective well-being and of
self-esteem for a woman towards her own body (body esteem). On the other
hand, women may be satisfying the self-enhancement drive and successfully
defending themselves psychologically against this threat to their self-esteem by
actively derogating the ever-present standard-setters and thus turning upward
comparison into downward comparison.
In this study, I examined women’s responses to inescapable social
comparison on the attribute of body size and shape with two groups of social
comparison targets:

photographs from popular magazines of (1) thin female

models and (2) heavy female models. Thus, I was able to examine a single
episode of social comparison with media targets on a single salient dimensionbody size and shape-by dividing the subjects into three groups and assessing
them on four dependent variables (body esteem,

mood, derogation of

comparison others, and salience of body size and shape), as well as on some
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exploratory variables.
Hypotheses
The two main hypotheses are as follows:

(1) women who engage in

inescapable social comparison with heavy models (Heavy condition) will show
less decrease in body esteem or mood (subjective well-being) and less incidence
of reporting a feared fat self (salience of body size and shape) than will the
women who view thin models (Thin condition); and (2) women in the Thin
condition may manage that potential threat to their body esteem or well-being
by engaging in more active downward comparison, i.e., derogating the thin
models on perceived traits,

than

the women in the

Heavy condition.

Furthermore, there were two subgroups in the Thin condition to determine
whether explicit expression of derogation is necessary to prevent a decrease in
body esteem. This question concerning an opportunity to express derogation
arises not only from Wills (1981) discussion of the two elements necessary for
derogation to function (see above), but also from a study by Swann and Hill
(1982) in which they found that subjects who were not given an opportunity to
reject and refute feedback disconfirming their self-conceptions changed their
self-ratings to be more in line with the self-discrepant feedback. Perhaps women
who are presented with an upward comparison opportunity, but given no
opportunity to derogate explicitly, will not reap the ego defense benefits that
derogation can provide.
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There were three conditions in all: (1) a Heavy Evaluative condition (HE),
in which subjects viewed and made evaluative ratings about heavy models, (2)
a Thin Evaluative condition (TE), in which subjects viewed and made evaluative
ratings about thin models, and (3) a Thin Nonevaluative condition (TN), in which
subjects viewed and made nonevaluative ratings (such as perceived darkness
of hair) about thin models.
Four dependent variables were measured: derogation of models, body
esteem, mood, and possible selves (salience of body size and shape). The first
three dependent measures were included on logical grounds based on social
comparison theory. The fourth, salience of body size and shape, was included
to determine whether an inescapable comparison with standard-setters makes
especially salient the discrepancy between the subject’s own body and the ideal
body.

Subjects had an opportunity to list nine "possible selves" that they

envisioned for themselves in the future, three hoped-for, three feared, and three
expected (Markus & Nurius, 1986). The predictions for the four dependent
variables are (a) that TE subjects would derogate models more than HE subjects,
(b) that HE subjects would have the highest score on body esteem, followed by
subjects in both the TE and the TN condition (who would be equal), (c) that HE
subjects would have the highest (most positive) score on mood, followed by TE
subjects (who had the opportunity to derogate), and then by TN subjects (who
had no derogation opportunity), and (d) that both TE and TN subjects would
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mention body size or shape in terms of a feared fat self or a hoped-for thin self
more frequently than HE subjects would.
In addition to the four dependent variables, two covariates were
investigated that may be related to responses to the social comparison
opportunity.

One covariate was calculated from the subjects’ self-reported

height and weight; using the means and standard deviations from national
norms for weight for women of all ages and heights (1979 Build and Blood
Pressure Study. 1980), a z-score on weight by age and height was computed for
each subject.

Responses to social comparison opportunities on a particular

dimension may be tied to individuals’ standings on that dimension; that is, a
woman’s stable self-concept relative to her body is likely to be a function of her
objective body size. Harrison and Ware (1987) analyzed women’s gaze time at
comparison targets by calculating z-scores based on height and weight for both
the subjects and the targets, and found that heavier women spent significantly
more time looking at heavier targets (i.e., those more similar in body size) than
did thinner women; they also found significant correlations between subjects’
z-scores and the z-scores of the targets they rated most attractive; that is, the
heavier the subject, the heavier the targets she rated as highly attractive.
Perhaps heavier women are inattentive and/or unresponsive to the ideals and
more attentive to representations of women who have bodies similar to theirs.
The second covariate measure was the Body Shape Questionnaire, which
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provided a score indicating the extent of concern the subjects had about their
own body appearance and their desire to change its shape (Cooper, Taylor,
Cooper, & Fairburn, 1987). This measure was included on logical grounds, that
women who are more concerned about a particular attribute will be more
responsive to social comparison on that attribute.
Finally, some exploratory variables were examined to determine whether
they interacted with the manipulation of biased distribution of comparison
targets. One of these was the subjects’ age.

Perhaps younger women have

more need to attend carefully to upward social comparison opportunities
because they are more uncertain about their appearance (due to inexperience).
Or perhaps younger women have had fewer opportunities to achieve in areas
other than physical attractiveness and thus consider it a central attribute. Or
perhaps they are assessed by others (e.g., young men) on their appearance
more than are older women. Another variable was the extent and nature of the
subjects’ exposure to the media. Women who never or rarely watch television
or read magazines might have either a less-articulated or less-extreme (in
thinness) cognitive representation of the ideal or less susceptibility to an
inescapable upward comparison, because they have assessed both the ideal and
their own standings on attractiveness using real-life women in the population
with fewer comparisons with the standard-setters in the media; or, possibly,
women

who

have

embraced

the

media-promoted

standard

of

beauty
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enthusiastically consume the media to reinforce their standards. A third variable
was the status of any romantic relationships in which the subjects may be
involved. It is possible that women who are seeking a romantic partner are more
concerned

about

and

sensitive

to

their

relative

standing

on

physical

attractiveness than are women who have a steady romantic partner. Another of
the exploratory variables was subjects’ scores on the Self-Monitoring (SM) Scale
(Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).

Subjects who engage in more self-monitoring

behavior are likely also to be more sensitive to social comparison information;
thus, scores on SM provided a covariate for subjects’ response to social
comparison opportunities. The last exploratory variable was scores on a locus
of control (LOC) scale (Levenson, 1981) which comprises three subscales:
Internal control of one’s own life, Powerful Others’ control of one’s life, and
Chance’s or fate’s control of one’s life (Levenson, 1981).

Scores on one

subscale of the LOC were examined for interaction with the independent variable
of biased social comparison opportunities. The prediction was that low Internal
subjects would engage more in social comparison (and score differently in the
four dependent measures) than high Internal subjects because low Internals are
less likely to carry internally-generated or internally-maintained standards against
which they compare themselves.
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Chapter 2
Method
Subjects
Sixty female undergraduates from psychology classes were invited to
participate in the experiment for extra credit. Fifty of the subjects indicated they
were White (83%), six indicated they were Black (10%), three that they were
Asian (5%), and one that she was Hispanic (2%). The subjects ranged in age
from 17 to 40 years, with a mean age of 22.5 years, and a standard deviation of
5.26 years. The subjects’ mean z-score for body size (self-reported height and
weight compared to norm tables [1979 Build and Blood Pressure Study. 1980])
was .11. The HE z-score mean was .31, the TE mean was .23, and the TN mean
was -.22. Sign-up sheets were posted for the general pre-test session, and at
that time appointments were set up for the individual experimental sessions.
Materials
At the general pre-test session, the subjects completed five paperand-pencil measures. The first comprised questions about the subjects’ age,
height and weight, the extent and nature of their exposure to the media, and the
status of any romantic relationships in which they might be involved (see
Appendix A).
The second measure was the Self-Monitoring (SM) Scale (Snyder &
Gangestad, 1986).

This scale measures three factors that make up the
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self-monitoring variable:

expressive self-control, social stage-presence, and

other-directed self-presentation (see Appendix B).

An internal consistency

(coefficient alpha) of +.70 was found by the researchers (Snyder & Gangestad,
1986).
The third measure in the general pre-test session was the Body Esteem
Scale (BES) developed by Franzoi and Shields (1984). They developed this
scale from an existing one by Secord and Jourard from 1953 and further
analyzed its components, reducing the number of items and determining its
principal factors for women and men. For women, the BES has three factors:
weight control and body proportions, facial features, and general health. The
weight concern factor (of interest here) included appetite, waist, thighs, body
build, buttocks, hips, legs, figure or physique, appearance of stomach, and
weight, essentially all body aspects that can be physically altered through
exercise or food intake. The alpha coefficient was .87 for the weight concern
factor among female samples (Franzoi & Shields, 1984).

For this study, the

subjects completed the full BES at the pre-test and following the experimental
manipulation; the weight concern subscale scores were treated as pre and post
repeated measures scores.

In order to encourage subjects to differentiate

between their usual attitude towards their bodies and their attitude following the
experimental manipulation, the wording differed slightly between the two
administrations: for the pre-test, the wording elicited trait-like responses (e.g.,
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How do you usually feel about this body part?), whereas for the post-test, the
wording elicited state-like responses (e.g., How do you feel right now about this
body part?) (see Appendix C).
The fourth measure at the pre-test was a locus of control (LOC) measure
developed by Levenson (1981). This 24-item instrument is actually composed
of three subscales of 8 items each: the Internal scale (I Scale), which measures
the extent to which people conceive of having control over their own lives; the
Powerful Others scale (P Scale), which measures people’s belief that others have
control over the events in their lives; and the Chance scale (C Scale), which
measures people’s perceptions of chance or fate controlling their lives (see
Appendix D). For the Internal scale, Levenson found the Kuder-Richardson to
by .64.
The last measure during the general pre-test session was the Body Shape
Questionnaire (BSQ) developed by Cooper et al. (1987) to investigate concerns
about body shape for young women in western cultures. This 34-item instrument
provides a measure of the extent of psychopathology (e.g., anorexia nervosa);
this measure has been normed on both non-patients and eating-disorder
patients (see Appendix E).

Tests of concurrent validity found significant

correlations between the BSQ and other measures of body concern: BSQ and
Eating Attitudes Test with bulimia nervosa patients (r = .35, p. < .02); BSQ and
Eating Attitudes Test with non-patients (r = .61, p. < .001); and BSQ and Body
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Dissatisfaction Scale of the Eating Disorder Inventory with bulimia nervosa
patients (r = .66, p. < .001).
The experimental session contained a number of different materials and
items, some of which were used during the social comparison opportunity and
some during the post-testing period.

The social comparison targets were

photographs of female models clipped from current popular magazines and
catalogues (e.g., Vogue , Spiegel’s, Good Housekeeping. Big Beautiful Woman)
and pilot-tested in the following manner. In order to sort the images into two
groups differing on a single major variable (heaviness of model), three
videotaped versions of 57 models in random order were compiled (20-30
seconds for each image); the versions differed only in the order in which the
models were presented.

Twelve subjects viewed version 1, seven viewed

version 2, and sixteen viewed version 3 (N = 35). These subjects viewed the
videotape and rated each of the 57 images on these six dimensions during the
20-30 second exposure time:

Body Size of model, attractiveness of Face,

attractiveness of Body, attractiveness of Clothes or outfit, Overall Attractiveness
of model, and Similarity of the model to the subject herself.

The response

format for these ratings was 1 to 7. The 35 subjects’ ratings for each model on
each dimension were summed and divided by the n for that response (some
data were missing due to nonresponse) to create six mean scores for each of
the 57 models; all sorting and matching was performed using these mean

33
scores. In other words, 342 individual distributions (57 models X 6 dimensions)
were calculated. The average standard error of the mean for the six dimensions
across the models ranges from .068 (for Similarity) to .177 (for Body Size),
suggesting good inter-rater agreement for the estimates of the six dimensions
for each model. Body Attractiveness and Body Size were negatively correlated
with one another (r = -.907, p = .0001), and because initial sorting was
according to Body Size, Body Attractiveness was not used for any later matching
or sorting. The aforementioned first sorting was achieved by splitting the 57
models on their Body Size score at the median, thus creating two groups, heavy
and thin models. A regression analysis revealed that the Overall Attractiveness
rating was a function of the ratings on Face and Clothes (R-square = .934, p <
.0001); both Face and Clothes contributed significant unique portions to that Rsquare. Therefore, individual models from each group were matched on Face
and Clothes ratings first, with a follow-up check that the Overall ratings also
matched. Seventeen matched pairs resulted from this process (using 34 of the
57 stimuli). An analysis of variance on these 34 images revealed a significant
difference between the two groups on Body Size (F (1,32) = 86.47, p < .0001)
and on Body Attractiveness (F (1,32) = 20.82, p < .0001).

No significant

differences were found between the two groups on Face (F (1,32) = .01, p =
.94), on Clothes (F (1,32) = .05, p = .82), on Overall Attractiveness (F (1,32) =
3.15, p = .086), and on Similarity (F (1,32) = .59, p = .45). Note that Overall
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Attractiveness is marginally significant (p = .086); this is a logical finding,
considering that attractiveness of one’s body is logically related to judgments of
overall attractiveness, and that Body Attractiveness and Body Size were
significantly correlated. The 34 photographs used in the experimental sessions
were individually mounted on paper and numbered: the heavy model photos
were affixed in random order to a large poster board for the HE condition, and
the same for the thin model photos for the TE and TN conditions.
During the social comparison portion of the experimental session, the
subjects completed two rating forms. The first was a Model Rating form (see
Appendix F), which provided HE and TE subjects with an opportunity to
derogate the models. The attributes in this measure were ones that do not
figure in fat/thin stereotypes in this culture. From a list of traits attributed to
female somatotypes (Hill, 1975), five evaluative attributes were selected
(pleasant, dependable, likable, truthful, and wise); they were not assigned
significantly differently to ectomorphic versus mesomorphic versus endomorphic
female silhouettes in Hill’s study. Subjects in the TN condition completed a
nonevaluative Model Rating form (see Appendix G) that occupied them for
roughly the same amount of time taken for the evaluative Model Rating form.
The second rating form gauged the subjects’ internal responses to the
social comparison opportunity through three separate measures.

The first

measure was the Possible Selves (PS) measure (see Appendix I); it was pilot
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tested along with the models’ photographs in order to obtain a base rate of
response in the University of Nebraska at Omaha population of female students.
This measure is one that Markus and Nurius (1986) developed to study
self-concept,

although

it

has

not

been

formally

constructed

and

no

psychometrics are available for it. They state that possible selves are those
"pictures" of the self in the past and in the future which are freely created by the
individual, but also formed by the individual’s historical and sociocultural
context. Markus and Nurius suggest that an individual’s stated possible selves
provide a current view of the self that is highly responsive to changes in the
environment.
The second measure in the post-test was Nowlis’ (1968) Mood Adjective
Check List (MACL). Nowlis identified 12 factors, represented by 49 adjectives.
For this study, an abbreviated version of the MACL was used, addressing only
those six factors believed to be affected by a biased social comparison
opportunity (see Appendix J). The Kuder-Richardson 20 estimates of internal
consistency ranged from .80 to .91.

The test-retest correlations had an

extremely wide range (from .07 to .78), which is Nowlis justifies by stating the
fact that the MACL measures mood change, which can occur in as little time as
it takes to readminister the test.

If one is feeling unhappy about one’s

appearance, one is likely to score low on the factors of Surgency, Elation, and
Vigor, and to score high on the factors of Fatigue, Anxiety, and Sadness. This
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statement is based on the responses female colleagues have made to the
question, "How would you feel or what would you want to do if you were at a
swimming party and you were the fattest one there?" Their responses were that
they would want to go home, not talk, be alone, not do anything, not move
around, sit quietly, and so on. Eliminated were the six factors of Aggression,
Concentration, Social Affection, Skepticism, Egotism, and Nonchalance. Each
of the factors has 2-6 adjectives associated with it and had a response format
ranging from 0 to 3.
The final measure following the social comparison opportunity was the
BES weight concern subscale (see above and Appendix C).
Procedure
All participants attended a general pre-test session in groups, at which
they were welcomed, informed of the general purpose of the experiment and of
the proposed schedule for participation, and given a consent form to read and
sign. The true purpose and hypotheses of the study were not divulged at this
time; rather, the subjects learned that this was a study of the "psychology of
fashion model preference." Dr. Louis Pol, an Associate Professor of Marketing
in the College of Business Administration, posed (in name only) as one of the
researchers in order to lend credibility to the cover story.
After reading and signing the consent form, the subjects completed the
five instruments described in the Materials section above: General Information,
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Body Shape, Self-Monitoring, Body Esteem, and Locus of Control.

After

completing the questionnaires, they turned in their forms and signed up for an
individual session time for the experimental portion of the study.
For the individual experimental sessions, the subjects were randomly
assigned to one of the three conditions (HE, TE, or TN), and were assigned one
of four experimenters (all four were women between 23 and 35 years old). At
least three days elapsed between the group session and the first individual
session in order to reduce the possibility that the questionnaires about body
esteem and body shape would enlighten the subjects about the hypotheses
prematurely.
At the beginning of the individual experimental session, the subjects
signed another consent form describing some basic details of the session. They
also recorded their social security number, which they indicated in the general
pre-test session.
After the subject signed the consent form, the experimenter instructed her
to complete the Model Rating form and the Comparison form while studying the
poster board bearing the photos of the models. The experimenter then left,
telling the subject to call her after she had finished the forms. The poster board
was propped against a wall in front of the subject so that she could sit at a table
to complete the forms.
When the subject had completed both the Model Rating form and the
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Comparison form, she called for the experimenter to return. No time limit was
placed on the subjects; the purpose of the form completion tasks was to ensure
exposure and attention to the comparison targets. The experimenter collected
the forms and gave the subject the dependent measures forms: Possible Selves,
Mood Adjective Check List, and Body Esteem subscale.

The experimenter

waited in the room while the subject completed these forms.
After these forms were completed, the experimenter discussed the
experiment and the subject’s feelings and thoughts in the following sequence.
First, the experimenter questioned the subject concerning her suspicions about
the study and her beliefs about the nature of the hypotheses.

Next, the

experimenter explained the study and the hypotheses in full and questioned the
subject about any insights she had into the phenomenon of social comparison
on the attribute of body size and shape.

She answered any questions the

subject had, thanked her for her participation, filled out the extra credit form,
and dismissed her.
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Chapter 3
Results
The main dependent variables to test the hypotheses were Body Esteem,
Mood, Derogation, and Possible Selves. The results of each of these measures
will be described below, followed by a description of the results of the
exploratory variables measured.
Body Esteem
There were two hypotheses concerning body esteem.

One was that

women who engage in inescapable social comparison with heavy models (HE
condition) will show less decrease in body esteem compared to the women who
view thin models (TE and TN conditions). The other hypothesis was that women
viewing thin models with an opportunity to derogate them explicitly (TE
condition) would show less decrease in body esteem than women viewing thin
models with no opportunity to derogate (TN condition).
Subjects rated the ten items making up the weight concern subscale of
the body esteem measure with values from one to five. Five represented the
most positive feelings. The ten item scores were summed for each subject (see
Table 1).
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Table 1

Body Esteem Scores by Condition
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges

Pre-test Body Esteem
Scores
means, standard
deviations, and actual
ranges
Post-test Body Esteem
Scores
means, standard
deviations, and actual
ranges
Adjusted post-test
Body Esteem means
(covariate = pre-test
Body Esteem Score)

Heavy
Evaluative

Thin
Evaluative

Thin
Nonevaluative

mean 27.45
sd
8.06
range 14-41

27.25
5.48
18-37

32.75
9.39
18-49

28.30
6.15
16-37

32.50
10.61
15-50

29.84

29.57

mean
sd
range

25.50
8.43
12-42

26.88

Possible range of scale = 10-50
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Random assignment to treatment group failed

to randomize the

distribution of body satisfaction as measured in the pre-test by the weight
concern subscale of the body esteem measure. Mean scores on the pre-test for
the three treatment conditions were significantly different in a one-way analysis
of variance by condition (F [2, 57] = 3.19, p = .0487).
As one might expect, pre-test body esteem scores were significantly
correlated with post-test body esteem scores (r = .7564, p = .0001) In addition,
the calculated z-score for subjects’ actual body size was significantly negatively
correlated with both the pre-test body esteem measure (r = -.5255, p = .0001)
and the post-test body esteem measure (r = -.4645, p = .0002). That is, the
lower the subjects’ z-score (i.e., the thinner the subjects reported themselves to
be), the higher (and more affectively positive) their body esteem score.
There are assumptions to be met before analysis of covariance can be
considered a valid technique for testing for differences in average dependent
variable scores among conditions (Elashoff, 1969). These assumptions are that:
(a)

not only are individuals randomly assigned to conditions, but all

conditions are treated exactly the same except for the experimental treatment
itself;
(b) the covariate measure to be included in the analysis is statistically
independent of the treatment effect, which can be achieved by measuring the
covariate in advance of the treatment and by randomizing the assignment of
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treatments to groups;
(c) the covariate is measured without error (i.e., is measured reliably);
(d) the relationship between the experimental variable and the covariate
is known or estimated based on theoretical grounds, prior experimentation, or
examination and analysis of x-y scatter plots;
(e)

the regression of y on x is linear and there is no treatment-slope

interaction;
(f) within each treatment group the experimental variable has a normal
distribution; and
(g) the variance of y scores for a given x is the same for each treatment
group and independent of x.
The scores on the Body Esteem post-test were adjusted by including the
covariate Body Esteem pre-test score. The two planned comparisons yielded no
significant difference on the adjusted post-test scores among the groups (see
Table 1). Comparison I, between the women viewing heavy models and those
viewing thin models (HE versus [TE + T N ]/2), resulted in a nonsignificant trend
in the opposite direction of the hypothesis (F [1,56] = 3.06, p = .0859);
Comparison II, within the Thin condition and between those subjects having an
opportunity to derogate and those having none (TE versus TN), resulted in
nonsignificance (F [1,56] = .02, p = .8890)
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All assumptions of analysis of covariance were not met for the variable
Body Esteem, namely assumption (a) above (random assignment to treatment
group failed to randomize distribution of the pre-test score on Body Esteem).
The two proposed covariates of body size (a z-score calculated from
height-weight population norm tables) and BSQ (a continuous score from the
Body Shape Questionnaire) are logical measures to use for adjusting initial bias
in the make-up of the treatment groups, as suggested by Elashoff (1969). Given
that the pre-test score on Body Esteem is already in the equation and that Body
Esteem correlates highly with body size, neither body size nor BSQ contribute
significantly to the total variance for the dependent measure Body Esteem.
The results do not support Hypothesis I, which predicted that women in
the Heavy condition would score higher on the Body Esteem post-test, nor do
they support Hypothesis II, which predicted that women with an opportunity to
derogate thin models explicitly would have higher Body Esteem scores than
those without that opportunity.
Mood
Mood was measured

in order to gauge the subjects’ subjective

well-being. The hypothesis predicted that women who view heavy models (HE
condition) will show less decrease in positive mood compared to women who
view thin models (TE and TN). In addition, a second comparison can be made
between the TE and TN conditions to determine whether subjects having an
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opportunity to derogate explicitly experience better moods than subjects having
no opportunity to derogate explicitly, when under the same ego-threatening
conditions.
According to Nowlis (1968), the Mood Adjective Check List breaks down
into six factors:

anxiety (clutched-up, fearful, jittery); surgency (carefree,

playful, lively, talkative); elation (elated, overjoyed, pleased, refreshed); fatigue
(drowsy, dull, sluggish, tired); sadness (regretful, sad, sorry); and vigor (active,
energetic, vigorous).

Subjects rated each adjective from zero to three to

indicate the degree to which the adjective described their current state. The
adjectives making up each factor were summed to determine factor scores.
Each of these six factors were examined separately to determine the effects the
experimental manipulation had on them.
Nowlis reported satisfactory reliabilities for these mood factors to be used
with confidence. However, in this study, with this particular sample of subjects,
the reliabilities ranged from quite high to fairly low. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the
six mood factors as measured in this study were as follows:

Fatigue = .7933,

Surgency = .7639, Vigor = .7608, Elation = .7259, Sadness = .6467, and Anxiety
= .4683. See Table 2 for a listing of the means, standard deviations, and ranges
for the six mood factors by condition.
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Table 2
Mood Factor Scores by Condition
Means, Standard Deviations, and Actual Ranges

Heavy
Evaluative
Sadness

mean
sd
range

1.70
2.34
0-7

Thin
Evaluative

Thin
Nonevaluative

0.60
1.10
0-3

1.65
1.90
0-6

Anxiety

2.25
1.83
0-7

1.25
1.48
0-4

2.60
2.33
0-7

Fatigue

4.50
2.90
0-11

3.95
3.80
0-11

4.50
2.98
0-8

Elation

4.70
3.08
0-11

4.75
2.93
0-11

4.50
2.86
0-10

Vigor

4.70
2.25
1-8

4.45
2.84
0-9

4.90
2.04
1-8

Surgency
(adjusted mean,
covariate = z-score)

6.22
3.87
0-12

6.59
3.19
0-12

4.83
3.04
0-10

Mood factor
Sadness
Anxiety
Fatigue
Elation
Vigor
Surgency

possible range mean
0-9
0-9
0-12
0-12
0-9
0-15
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Anxiety was the only mood factor to yield significance as a dependent
measure (see Table 2).

Comparison I (HE versus [TE

+ T N ]/2 ) was

nonsignificant (F [1,57] = .39, p = .5375). However, Comparison II (TE versus
TN) was significant (E [1,57] = 4.99, p = .0295). The assumptions for analysis
of covariance (Elashoff, 1969) were met for the covariates body size and BSQ
but they were not included in the analysis as neither contributed significantly to
total variance.
Sadness was nonsignificant for Comparison I (F [1,57] = 1.28, p = .2617),
and it was nonsignificant, yet in the direction of prediction, for Comparison II (F
[1,57] = 3.21, p = .0783).

Because body size and BSQ did not contribute

significantly to the variance for Sadness, neither was included in the analysis.
Surgency was nonsignificant for Comparison I (E [1,56] = .30, p = .58)
and for Comparison II (E [1,56] = 2.77, p = .1018). Body size (z-score) met
Elashoff’s assumptions and was included as a covariate in the analysis (E [1,56]
= 3.94, p = .0521); BSQ was not.
Elation showed no significant results for Comparison I (E [1,57] = .01, p
= .9266) or for Comparison II (F [1,57] = .07, p = .7903). Furthermore, body
size and BSQ did not contribute significantly to the overall variance and were
not used.
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Fatigue yielded significance for neither Comparison I (F [1,57] = .08, p =
.7803) nor Comparison II (F [1,57] = .34, p = .5626). Body size and BSQ did not
contribute significantly to the overall variance and were not used.
Finally, Vigor was nonsignificant for Comparison I (E [1,57] = .00, _p =
.9698) and for Comparison II (F [1,57] = .35, p = .5560). The variables body
size and BSQ were nonsignificant and thus were not included in the analysis.
The results do not support the hypothesis for Comparison I, i.e., there was
no difference in mood factor scores between subjects in the Thin and Heavy
conditions. However, the hypothesis for Comparison II was supported for the
mood factor anxiety (but not the other five mood factors), i.e., within the Thin
condition, subjects having an opportunity to make evaluative comments about
the models had lower anxiety scores than subjects having no such opportunity.
Derogation
The hypothesis concerning derogation predicted that women viewing thin
models will derogate the models (engage in active downward social comparison)
more than the women viewing heavy models.

Thus, this comparison was

between the subjects in the TE condition (thin models, with an opportunity for
evaluation) and the subjects in the HE condition (heavy models, with an
opportunity for evaluation).

Of course, subjects in the TN condition had no

opportunity to evaluate the models on the value-laden attributes, and they are
therefore not included in this analysis.
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The reliability for the Derogation measure was adequate (Cronbach’s
Alpha = .8828). For the derogation variable, the higher the score, the more the
subjects derogated the models (see Table 3).
Comparisons for derogation involved only the subjects in the TE and HE
conditions; thus the number of observations for Comparison I for the derogation
measure was 40. However, there was no significant difference between the two
groups in the Derogation score when only Comparison I was used in the
regression equation (F [1,38] = 2.47, p = .1240). Neither body size nor BSQ
were included as covariates because neither contributed significantly to the
variance.
A univariate analysis of the evaluative adjectives (each adjective summed
separately across models) revealed a near-significant difference between the HE
and TE conditions for the rating on "likable-unlikable" (F [1,38] = 3.55, p =
.0670). In this analysis, the HE mean was 40.55 and the TE mean, 45.0 (again,
the higher the score, the more negative the ratings), suggesting that women in
the HE condition found the heavy models to be more "likable" than the women
in the TE condition found the thin models.

None of the other evaluative

adjectives approached significance when analyzed in this fashion.
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Table 3

Derogation Scores by Condition
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges

Heavy Evaluative

mean
sd
range

216.65
30.38
167-275

Thin Evaluative

230.00
22.75
179-270

Possible range of scale = 85-425 (midpoint = 255.0)
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One interesting and unanticipated result was that there was a significant
difference in overall derogation between the TE and HE conditions when the
anxiety measure was added as a covariate.

The overall E-squared for this

analysis was .1888 (E [2,37] = 4.31, p = .0208). Each of these two variables
contributed significantly to the overall variance: Anxiety (F [1,37] = 5.82, p =
.0209) and Comparison I (F [1,37] = 5.32, p = .0268).

Note that the mean

anxiety score in the HE condition was 2.25 and in the TE condition was 1.25, the
value for the orthogonally coded group membership vector was -1 for TE and 2
for HE, and the beta coefficient was negative for the vector representing group
membership.

This means that the more anxious the subjects in the Thin

Evaluative condition reported themselves to be, the more they derogated the
models compared to those subjects in the Heavy condition.
Possible Selves
The Possible Selves measure was included to determine saliency of body
size and shape as a result of ego-threatening social comparison.

It was

hypothesized that women viewing the thin models (TE and TN) would feel more
concern about their body size and shape because the thin models had made the
ideal so salient. Thus, women in the TE and TN conditions were expected to
make more statements about a feared fat self than women in the HE condition.
Furthermore, it was also hypothesized that an opportunity to derogate the thin
models should relieve subjects of much of the threat to the ego, so subjects in
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the TN condition were expected to make more statements about a feared fat self
than women in the TE condition.
Each subject received a Possible Selves (PS) score (total number of
mentions of weight or body size out of nine possible mentions, with thinness
being desirable). There were 37 mentions in all, generated by 20 of the 60
subjects. Two individuals independently reviewed the subjects’ responses and
counted these mentions by condition (HE, TE, TN) and by category (Hoped For,
Feared, Expected) (see Table 4).

There was complete agreement about

occurrences of body size except for one case: one subject hoped for a possible
self of "model," possibly suggesting thinness as an associated attribute.
However, "model" was excluded as a positive occurrence of a mention of a thin
self as desirable because it could mean so many other things.
A chi-square analysis of the data revealed no significant differences
across the three conditions (X2 [2] = 6.0, p = .199). Neither body size nor BSQ
contributed significantly to the total variance and thus were not included as
covariates.
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Table 4

Frequency of Mentions of Weight or Body Size
by Condition and by Category

Heavy
Evaluative

Thin
Evaluative

Thin
Nonevaluative

Hoped-for self

Feared self

Expected self

37
mentions
generated
by 20
subjects

Possible range of scale = 0-9
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Exploratory Variables
The five exploratory variables (age, media exposure, romantic relationship,
internal locus of control, and self-monitoring) were measured before the
experimental manipulation; randomization is confirmed by the absence of
significant differences in these variables across the three treatment groups when
analyzed in a one-way analysis of variance. None of the variables contributed
significantly as a covariate for Comparisons I and II, the examination of
significant differences in the dependent measures as a result of the experimental
manipulation.
However, some of the exploratory variables did yield significant or
near-significant results for some of the dependent measures when analyzed
alone, without using the treatment groupings as an independent variable in the
regression equation. High frequency of possible selves (PS) as feared-fat and/or
hoped for-thin were significantly related to the exploratory variable romantic
relationships (F [1,58] = 3.79, p = .0563) (see Table 5). A high score on the PS
measure indicated higher salience of body size and shape, and a high score on
the relationship variable indicated perceived stability of a current romantic
relationship, with no current relationship scored as zero.
High frequency of media consumption (magazines and television)
accounted for a near-significant amount of variance in the dependent variable
of body satisfaction (F [1,58] - 3.56, p = .0642). The beta coefficient for media
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consumption was negative, indicating that the higher the frequency score on
media consumption, the lower the score on body esteem.
There was a trend in the predicted direction for the relationship between
the score on the self-monitoring scale and the score on body esteem (E [1,58]
= 3.32, q = .0737). Thus, the higher a subject scored on the self-monitoring
scale, the lower her score on the body esteem scale (see Table 5).
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Table 5

Correlation Matrix for Exploratory Variables

PS
Possible Selves
(PS)

BE-1

LOC-I

RELAT

MEDIA

AGE

SM

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

--

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

r= 1.0

e=o.o
n =60
Body Esteem
(pre-test) (BE-1)

.02

1.0

.86
60

0.0
60

.09

.06

1.0

.50
58

.65
58

0.0
58

Status of
Romantic
Relationships
(RELAT)

.25

.001

.28

1.0

.06
60

.99
60

.03
58

0.0
60

Media
Consumption
(MEDIA)

-.07

-.24

.18

.06

1.0

.61
60

.06
60

.18
58

.67
60

0.0
60

Age (AGE)

.06

-.12

-.06

-.05

.14

1.0

.67
60

.35
60

.63
58

.68
60

.92
60

0.0
60

-.12

-.23

.19

-.09

-.02

-.02

1.0

.35
60

.07
60

.15
58

.47
60

.85
60

.90
60

0.0
60

Internal Locus of
Control (LOC-I)

Self Monitoring
(SM)
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Chapter 4
Discussion

The intent of this study was to examine women’s responses to
inescapable social comparison on the attribute of body size and shape. The
hypotheses tested were:
(1) women who engage in inescapable social comparison with heavy
models will show less decrease in body esteem or mood and less
incidence of reporting a feared fat self than will the women who view thin
models, and
(2) women engaging in inescapable social comparison with thin models
may manage that potential threat to their body esteem or well-being by
derogating the thin models on perceived traits more than will those
women comparing with the heavy models.
The experiment succeeded in operationally testing both hypotheses. The
independent variables were

heavy versus thin

comparison targets and

opportunity versus no opportunity for explicit derogation.

The comparison

targets differed significantly on body size, but not on attractiveness. The four
main dependent variables (body esteem, mood, possible selves, and derogation)
were found to have adequate reliabilities and some were from known, validated
instruments.
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Body Esteem
The results do not support Hypothesis I, i.e., that women in the Heavy
condition will score higher (more positively) on the post-manipulation body
esteem measure than women in the Thin conditions. As a matter of fact, there
was a nonsignificant trend (p = .0859) in the opposite direction of the
hypothesis.
What could explain these findings? One possibility was stated above: the
single episode of social comparison has little impact compared to a lifetime of
social comparison opportunities. This possibility is supported by the marginally
significant media consumption measure being a predictor of body esteem (p =
.06).

If women who consume media images with high frequency also feel

relatively worse about their bodies than women who consume media images
less, then we can infer that exposure to those media images means exposure to
the seemingly unattainable physical ideal of the culture. That ideal is likely to
be internalized as a prototype, and a one-shot exposure to heavy models from
the media may neither budge that prototype as ideal and desirable nor
ameliorate a harsh self-judgment on body attractiveness.
Additionally, exposure to the heavy models may have made salient that
those body sizes and shapes are not the ideal. If an HE subject feels that the
heavy models look somewhat like her and that the heavy models represent less
than the ideal, she may feel particularly dissatisfied with her own body. At a
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recent convention of the American Psychological Association (New Orleans,
August, 1989), Wills (1989) introduced in a symposium on social comparison the
possibility that downward comparison situations may backfire, in a sense,
providing an opportunity for the individual to see his or her possible future self
in the comparison target and to be possibly disheartened at the similarity
between this possible self and the current self.

This line of reasoning

emphasizes the complexity of the social comparison process, and calls for
additional empirical studies incorporating such a hypothesis.
The second main hypothesis in this study was not supported either, i.e.,
that women faced with a threatening social comparison will manage the ego
threat if they have an opportunity to derogate the comparison targets, creating
active downward social comparison, and will thus score higher on a body
esteem measure than will women faced with the same threat but with no
opportunity to derogate the targets.
This lack of support for the second hypothesis on the dependent variable
Body Esteem may be due to several factors. First, perhaps the women without
an opportunity to derogate the models explicitly to the experim enter were able
to achieve the effects of active downward social comparison by expressing
derogation to themselves mentally (e.g., "I’m glad I’m not her; what a stupid
outfit/expression/hairdo."). The subjects were not asked to report such self-talk,
and so we do not know if they engaged in this behavior.
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Another explanation for the finding is that the social comparison
opportunity was not particularly threatening to the women in the Thin condition.
If they have seen such images of models all their lives, then this episode may
have been a drop in the bucket in terms of threat to their self esteem. However,
the subjects’ comments during the debriefing lead me to discount this last
explanation.

The experimenters reported that, during the debriefing, the

subjects tended to express exasperation, envy, or irritation towards the thin
models, with comments such as, "Women like her make me sick," Til never look
that good," and "Look at her; she’s so gorgeous." Unfortunately, I did not collect
these comments in an empirical fashion; nevertheless, their preponderance as
reported by all three experimenters suggests that the social comparison
opportunity with standard-setters was a salient one.
The nonsignificant trend (p = .07) for the relationship between the score
on the self-monitoring scale (SM) and the score on body esteem is interesting,
in that it raises the question, Does self-monitoring predict dissatisfaction with
one’s body shape or size because of closer scrutiny to oneself or because of
closer adherence to societal standards?
Mood
While Hypothesis I was not supported (there was no difference in mood
factor scores between subjects in the Thin and in the Heavy conditions),
Hypothesis II (the comparison between TE and TN) was supported for the mood
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factor anxiety (g = .0295). The mood factor sadness was nonsignificant, yet in
the direction of prediction (p = .078) for Hypothesis II.
As mentioned above, the low reliability of the anxiety measure with this
sample raises questions about the accuracy of this inferential analysis, although
the Mood Adjective Check List was originally created and validated with higher
reliability (Nowlis, 1968).

Despite this reservation, I interpret the congruent

findings of the anxiety and sadness factors to mean that having an opportunity
to derogate in a public fashion (to the experimenter) did make a difference in
levels of psychological discomfort, as measured by those particular factors.
That is, TE subjects, who had an opportunity to derogate, had significantly lower
levels of anxiety (and perhaps lower levels of sadness) than did those in the TN
condition, who had no opportunity to derogate.
Derogation
Hypothesis II, concerning derogation, predicted that women in the Thin
condition would derogate the thin models to a greater extent than the women
in the Heavy condition would derogate the heavy models. This hypothesis was
not supported when treatment group was used as the sole independent
variable.

But when the anxiety measure was included as a covariate, the

hypothesis was supported (p = .02). Thus, subjects scoring high on the anxiety
factor in the post-manipulation measures derogated more if they were in the Thin
condition than if they were in the Heavy condition.
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Obviously, the process of derogation in social comparison is not simple
or straightforward.

Perhaps anxiety or some minimal level of psychological

discomfort is necessary before derogation occurs. As noted above, however,
there was no difference in body esteem scores between the TE and the TN
(opportunity vs. no opportunity to derogate), suggesting that, even though
derogation may kick in during threatening social comparison opportunities, it
may not provide dimension-specific defense for the individual.
There are two items to note here. First of all, the anxiety measure yielded
a rather low Cronbach’s alpha (.4683) in this sample, which requires that we
infer cautiously from the statistical analysis.

Clearly, additional research is

necessary on the role of psychological discomfort in downward social
comparison and derogation processes.
Secondly, the anxiety measure was a post-manipulation one, and no
pre-manipulation anxiety measure was taken. The question here is, How does
the post-treatment measure compare to the subjects’ pre-manipulation levels of
anxiety? Is the post-manipulation level in fact lower than the pre-manipulation
level for the TE subjects, in which case, derogation might have helped them
manage threat to their psychological comfort, if not their body esteem. Or do
chronically anxious people derogate standard-setters more?
Possible Selves
Neither Hypothesis I nor II was supported by the data for the Possible
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Selves measure. It is entirely possible that body size and shape were equally
salient to all treatment groups as a result of the content of the pre-tests, the
experimental materials themselves (photographs of models), and the cultural
mandates for thinness that the subjects have undoubtedly experienced.

It is

also possible that the social comparison was not particularly salient to the
subjects, as suggested by the fact that only one-third of the subjects mentioned
body size or shape in the possible selves measure.
A surprising finding is for one of the exploratory variables, status of
romantic relationship.

An unpredicted, marginally significant (p =

.056)

relationship exists between perceived stability of relationship and mentions of
body size and shape in the possible selves measure. Those subjects reporting
more stable romantic relationships also mentioned body size or shape more
frequently in the possible selves measure. Why might this be? Logic suggests
the opposite:

that women who are seeking a relationship or who consider

themselves in an unstable one would be more concerned with their appearance
(an exchangeable commodity in the romantic partner selection market,
according to Lakoff and Scherr, 1984), as compared to women who consider
themselves firmly ensconced in a romantic relationship. Given the age of the
subjects in this sample (mean = 22.55 years), they are probably in the process
of selecting a mate and may have already experienced several different romantic
partners in high school and college.

Perhaps those subjects currently in a
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relationship are those that are more successful at attracting a romantic partner
and may find themselves in serial monogamous relationships with little "down
time" between partners.

Such individuals may place more value on their

appearance as it has undoubtedly played a meaningful role in the development
and maintenance of their romantic relationships so far.

Or perhaps those

women who report an uncommitted or nonexistent romantic relationship are not
particularly interested in one at this time, as they are busy with school and work
and are preparing for their own careers; and perhaps they are correspondingly
indifferent to conforming to or worrying about the culture’s prescription for
beauty.
Implications
Did the women in this study unconsciously manage their attention to,
evaluation of, and comparison to other women through social comparison
processes?

The different social comparison targets seemed to make no

difference to the subjects’ body esteem and possible selves measures.
But derogation seemed to play a role: having an opportunity to derogate
the thin models did seem to relieve women in the Thin condition of anxiety and
possibly sadness. In addition, when anxiety was used as a covariate, there was
a predicted difference in derogation between the Thin and Heavy conditions.
Women faced with the thin comparison others and having a higher level of
anxiety derogated more. However, this derogation did not seem to provide any
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relief to the ego threat on body esteem, so it is unclear why this derogation
might occur.

Perhaps it provides relief to the ego threat on some other

dimension of self perception.
|The media appear to play a role in the shaping of women’s body esteem
through social comparison processes?)Those women reporting high frequency
of media consumption also felt relatively worse about their bodies. While the
media consumption variable was not manipulated in this study, this marginally
significant finding suggests some areas for future research in terms of the
conscious use of social comparison to manage threats to self-esteem. Would
it be possible for women to train themselves not to attend to certain images, in
the media for example, and to attend selectively to other, more flattering
comparisons? In other words, must downward social comparison, both implicit
(through selection of less desirable targets) and explicit (through derogation of
more desirable targets), be unconscious to be effective?

An interesting

experiment would be to train women to attend selectively to heavier comparison
targets and to make explicit observations on related attributes for thinner
comparison targets. Will we see differences? And, if so, will those differences
be meaningful enough to consider how they might help women who have
destructively negative perceptions of their own bodies?

Could a behavioral

intervention be developed for women whose negative self-evaluation manifests
itself in bulimia or anorexia nervosa?
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The role of defensive social comparison is largely unexplored in the area
of physical attractiveness.

The results of this study suggest that derogation

does play a part in women’s management of ego threat from standard-setters of
body size and shape. But, unfortunately, the results suggest only, and do not
permit straightforward conclusions about how defensive social comparison
operates on the dimension of physical size and shape.
A revised approach for examination of this topic would be to measure
women’s moods (in particular anxiety and sadness) in advance of any
experimental manipulation in order to determine a within-subjects effect.
Furthermore, I would expand the derogation opportunities and limitations in
order to probe for the role of "public-ness" of derogation in defensive social
comparison. That is, is it possible to manage ego threat by thinking privately of
derogatory evaluations rather than by expressing them to another? Finally, the
issue of a single episode being swamped by a lifetime of social comparison
opportunities with standard-setters needs to be addressed. How powerful is a
single episode? What elements contribute to its salience and impact on self
perception and how can they be measured?

66
References

1979 Build and Blood Pressure Study. (1980). Society of Actuaries.
Alicke, M. D., Smith, R. H., & Klotz, M. L. (1986). Judgments of physical
attractiveness: The role of faces and bodies. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin. 12, 381-389.
’Breast obsession’ leads to the surgical knife. (1986, October 26). Omaha
World-Herald. 14.
Cash, T. F., Winstead, B. A., & Janda, L. H. (1986, April). The great
American shape-up: Body image survey report. Psychology Today. 30-37.
Cooper, P. J., Taylor, M. J., Cooper, A., & Fairburn, C. G. (1987). The
development and validation of the body shape questionnaire. International
Journal of Eating Disorders. 6, 485-494.
Demomemo. (1987, June). American Demographics. 4.
Elashoff, J. D. (1969). ANCOVA: A delicate instrument. American
Educational Research Journal. 8, 383-401.
Fallon, A. E., & Rozin, P. (1985). Sex differences in perceptions of desirable
body shape. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 94. 102-105.
Feeling fat in a thin society: Body image survey. (1984, February). Glamour.
198-201, 251-252.
Festinger, L. A. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human
Relations,
117-140.

z,

Franzoi, S. L., & Herzog, M. B. (1987). Judging physical attractiveness:
What body aspects do we use? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
13, 19-33.
Franzoi, S. L., & Shields, S. A. (1984). The body esteem scale:
Multidimensional structure and sex differences in a college population.
Journal of Personality Assessment. 48, 173-178.

67
Garner, D. M., Garfinkel, P. E., Schwartz, D., & Thompson, M. (1980).
Cultural expectations of thinness in women. Psychological Reports. 47,
483-491.
Gerbner, G., Gross, L., Morgan, M., & Signorielli, N. (1986). Living with
television: The dynamics of the cultivation process. In J. Bryant & D.
Zillmann (Eds.), Perspectives on media effects (pp. 17-40). Hillsdale, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Goethals, G. R., & Darley, J. M. (1977). Social comparison theory: An
attributional approach. In J. M. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison
processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives (pp. 259-278).
Washington, DC: Hemisphere/Halstead.
Goode, E., & Preissler, J. (1983). The fat admirer. Deviant Behavior: An
Interdisciplinary Journal. 4, 175-204.
Gray, W. H. (1977). Social aspects of body image: Perceptions of normalcy
of weight and affect of college undergraduates. Perceptual and Motor Skills.
4f>, 1035-1040.
Gruder, C. L. (1977). Choice of comparison persons in evaluating oneself.
In J. M. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison processes: Theoretical
and
em p irical
p erspectives
(pp.
2 1 -4 1 ).
W ashin gton ,
DC:
Hemisphere/Halstead.
Harris, M. B. (1983). Eating habits, restraint, knowledge and attitudes toward
obesity. International Journal of Obesity. 7, 271-286.
Harrison, W. A., & Ware, S. E. (1987). [Motivational and defensive social
comparison]. Manuscript in preparation.
Hill, E. C. (1975). Traits attributed to female somatotypes. Unpublished
master’s thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Janson, H. W. (1971). A Basic History of Art. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Lakoff, R. T., & Scherr, R. L. (1984). Face value: The politics of beauty.
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

68
Levenson, H. (1981). Differentiating among internality, powerful others, and
chance. In H.M. Lefcourt (Ed.), Research with the locus of control
construct: Vol. 1 Assessment methods (pp. 15-66). New York: Academic
Press.
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist. 41,
954-969.
McCrea, C. W., Summerfield, A. G., & Rosen, B. (1982). Body image: A
selective review of existing measurement techniques. British Journal of
Medical Psychology. 55, 225-233.
Miller, C. T. (1982). The role of performance-related similarity in social
comparison of abilities: A test of the related attributes hypothesis. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology. 16, 513-523.
Nowlis, B. (1968). Research with the mood adjective check list. In S. S.
Tomkins & C. E. Izard (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and personality (pp.
352-389). New York: Springer.
Rand, C. S., & Hall, J. A. (1983). Sex differences in the accuracy of
self-perceived attractiveness. Social Psychology Quarterly. 46. 359-363.
Rodin, J., Silberstein, L. R., & Striegel-Moore, R. H. (1985). Women and
weight: A normative discontent. In T. B. Sonderegger (Ed.), Nebraska
symposium on motivation: Volume 32. Psychology and Gender, (pp.
267-307). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Schlosberg, J. (1987, July). The demographics of dieting. American
Demographics. 35-37, 61-62.
Silverstein, B., Perdue, L., Peterson, B., & Kelly, E. (1986). The role of the
mass media in promoting a thin standard of bodily attractiveness for women.
Sex Roles. 14, 519-532.
Snyder, M., & Gangestad, S. (1986). On the nature of self-monitoring:
Matters of assessment, matters of validity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 51, 125-139.

69
Striegel-Moore, R. H., Silberstein, L. R., & Rodin, J. (1986). Toward an
understanding of risk factors for bulimia. American Psychologist. 41,
246-263.
Swann, W. B., Jr., & Hill, C. A. (1982). When our identities are mistaken:
Reaffirming self-conceptions through social interaction.
Journal
Personality and Social Psychology. 43, 59-66.

of

Wegner, D. M., & Vallacher, R. R. (1977). Implicit psychology: An
introduction to social cognition. Oxford University Press: New York.
Wheeler, L., Koestner, R., & Driver, R. E. (1982). Related attributes in the
choice of comparison others: It’s there, but it isn’t all there is. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology. 3, 489-500.
Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychology.
Psychological Bulletin.
245-271.
Wills, T. A. (1989, August). (Chair). Current perspectives in social
comparison theory.
Symposium presented at American Psychological
Association, New Orleans.
Wood, J. V., Taylor, S. E., & Lichtman, R. R. (1985). Social comparison in
adjustment to breast cancer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
43, 1169-1183.

70
Appendix A
General Information
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Your responses are
important, and we hope that you will respond carefully to all of the questions we
will be asking you.
We will take care to keep all of your responses confidential. At the end of the
study, we will keep all questionnaires and response forms in private, locked files;
we will only report summary statistics in the write-ups. Your name will never be
associated with your responses; only your social security number (your UNO
student ID number) will be used. This number will never be reported in any
write-up.
To begin with, we need some basic information. Please complete this form,
following the directions for each section.
Put all of your responses directly on this sheet. In order to make correlations
between your responses today and responses you make at the individual
session, we need to have you identify yourself. We do not want your name,
however. We want you to write your social security number here:

1.
2.
3.
4.

How old are you ?_____years old
inches (without shoes)
How tall are you ?_____ fe e t
How much do you weigh?
pounds (without clothing)
Are you involved in a romantic relationship right now?
a. yes (answer # 5 )
b.no (skip # 5 )

5. (Answer this question only if you answered "yes" to #4).
How confident are you that this relationship will last?
a. not at all confident
b. slightly confident
c. moderately confident
d. quite confident
e. extremely confident
6. How many different magazine issues do you read per month?
I usually re a d
different magazine issues each month.
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7.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

How much television do you usually watch?
very little
a small amount
a moderate amount
quite a bit
a lot
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Appendix B
Revised Self-Monitoring Scale
(Personal Reaction Inventory)
Directions. The statements on the following pages concern your personal
reactions to a number of different situations. No two statements are exactly
alike, so consider each statement carefully before answering.
If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, blacken the space
marked "a" on your answer sheet. If a statement is FALSE or NOT USUALLY
TRUE as applied to you, blacken the space marked "b". Do not put your
answers on this test booklet itself.
Remember, "a" represents TRUE, and "b" represents FALSE.
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (F)
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that
others will like. (F)
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. (F)
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost
no information. (T)
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. (T)
6. I would probably make a good actor. (T)
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. (F)
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different
persons. (T)
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. (F)
10. I’m not always the person I appear to be. (T)
11.1 would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please
someone else or win their favor. (F)
12. I have considered being an entertainer. (T)
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1 3 . 1 have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. (F)
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different
situations. (F)
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. (F)
16. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I
should. (F)
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right
end). (T)
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. (T)

74
Appendix C
Body Esteem Scale (Physical Awareness Scale)
Directions. Each of the items in the list below concerns an aspect of your
physical self. Please indicate how you usually (right now) feel about these
aspects of yourself by rating each item on the scale. Rate each item by
blackening the appropriate circle on the answer sheet using the key below,
a = I usually (right now) have extremely strong positive feelings
b = I usually (right now) have somewhat strong positive feelings
c = I usually (right now) have neither positive nor negative feelings
d = I usually (right now) have somewhat strong negative feelings
e = I usually (right now) have extremely strong negative feelings
1. body scent

15.

2. appetite

16. breasts

3. nose

17.

4. physical stamina

18.

5. reflexes

19.

6. lips

20.

7. muscular strength

21.

8. waist

22.

9. energy level

23.

10. thighs

24.

11. ears

25.

12. biceps

26.

13. chin

27. sex activities

14. body build

28. body hair
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29. physical coordination

32. physical condition

30. buttocks

33. face

31. width of shoulders

34. weight
35. agility
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Appendix D
I.P. and C Scales
(Social Attitudes Scale)
Directions. You will read a series of attitude statements. Each represents
a commonly held opinion, There are no right or wrong answers. You will
probably agree with some items and disagree with others. We are interested in
the extent to which you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion.
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you
agree or disagree by blackening the appropriate space on your answer sheet.
The letters and their meanings are as follows:
a =
b =
c =
d =
e =
f =

I agree strongly with this statement,
I agree som ew hat with this statement,
I agree slightly with this statement,
I disagree slightly with this statement,
I disagree som ew hat with this statement,
I disagree strongly with this statement.

First impressions are usually best. Use the response that is closest to
the way you feel.
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability.
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.
3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people.
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a
driver I am.
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck
happenings.
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky.
8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership
responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power.
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9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am.
10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others.
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck.
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests
when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too farahead because many things
out to be a matter of good or bad fortune.

turn

15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to
be in the right place at the right time.
17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, Iprobably wouldn’t
make many friends.
18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests.
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver.
21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it.
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires
of people who have power over me.
23. My life is determined by my own actions.
24. It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many
friends.

78
Appendix E
Body Shape Questionnaire
This questionnaire is designed to find out how you have been feeling
about your appearance over the past four weeks. Please read each question
and choose your response according to the following key:
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Usually Always
a
b
c
d
e
f
Please blacken the appropriate space on your answer sheet for each
question. Please do not leave any blank.
O VER TH E PAST FOUR WEEKS:
1. Has feeling bored made you brood about your shape?
2. Have you been so worried about your shape that you have been feeling that
you ought to diet?
3. Have you thought that your thighs, hips, or bottom are too large for the rest
of you?
4. Have you been afraid that you might become fat (or fatter)?
5. Have you worried about your flesh not being firm enough?
6. Has feeling full (e.g., after eating a large meal) made you feel fat?
7. Have you felt so bad about your shape that you have cried?
8. Have you avoided running because your flesh might wobble?
9. Has being with thin women made you feel self-conscious about your shape?
10. Have you worried about your thighs spreading out when sitting down?
11. Has eating even a small amount of food made you feel fat?
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12. Have you noticed the shape of other women and felt that your own shape
compared unfavorably?
13. Has thinking about your shape interfered with your ability to concentrate
(e.g., while watching television, reading, listening to conversations)?
14. Has being naked, such as when taking a bath, made you feel fat?
15. Have you avoided wearing clothes which make you particularly aware of the
shape of your body?
16. Have you imagined cutting off fleshy areas of your body?
17. Has eating sweets or other high calorie food made you feel fat?
18. Have you not gone out to social occasions (e.g., parties) because you have
felt bad about your shape?
19. Have you felt excessively large and rounded?
20. Have you felt ashamed of your body?
21. Has worry about your shape made you diet?
22. Have you felt happiest about your shape when your stomach has been empty
(e.g., in the morning)?
23. Have you thought that you are the shape you are because you lack
self-control?
24. Have you worried about other people seeing rolls of flesh around your waist
or stomach?
25. Have you felt that it is not fair that other women are thinner than you?
26. Have you vomited in order to feel thinner?
27. When in company have you worried about taking up too much room (e.g.,
sitting on a sofa or a bus seat)?
28. Have you worried about your flesh being dimply?
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29. Has seeing your reflection (e.g., in a mirror or shop window) made you feel
bad about your shape?
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Appendix F
Evaluative Model Ratings
Please rate the models in the pictures on the following attributes. Each
attribute has five levels associated with it. Please use the following key for your
ratings:
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

She
She
She
She
She

seems
seems
seems
seems
seems

very much this way (the attribute on the left).
som ew hat this way (on the left).
in betw een these two attributes.
som ew hat this way (on the right).
very much this way (on the right).

Please circle the rating that you select for each model on each attribute.
For example, if you feel that Model # 5 9 seems somewhat talkative, then
you should circle the number 2 near the "talkative" side:
talkative 1 2 3 4 5

untalkative

For example, if you feel that Model # 5 9 seems neither successful nor
unsuccessful, then you should circle the number 3 in the middle:
successful 1 2

3 4 5 unsuccessful

MODEL #
1

2

3

4

5

unpleasant

dependable 1

2

3

4

5

undependable

unlikable

1

2

3

4

5

likable

truthful

1

2

3

4

5

untruthful

foolish

1

2

3

4

5

wise

pleasant
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Appendix G
Nonevaluative Model Ratings
Please rate the models in the pictures on the following attributes. Each
attribute has five levels associated with it. Please use the following key for your
ratings:
1 = She seems very much this way (the attribute on the left).
2= She seems som ew hat this way (on the left).
3 = She seems In betw een these two attributes.
4
= She seems som ew hat this way (on the right).
5
= She seems very much this way (on the right).
Please circle the rating that you select for each model on each attribute.
For example, if you feel that Model # 5 9 seems somewhat tall, then you
should circle the number 2 near the "tall" side:
tall

1 2 3 4 5

short

For example, if you feel that Model # 5 9 seems neither young nor old, then
you should circle the number 3 in the middle:
old

12

MODEL #

3 4 5

young

has:

dark hair

1

2

3

4

5

light hair

warm clothing

1

2

3

4

5

cool clothing

straight hair

1

2

3

4

5

curly hair

many siblings

1

2

3

4

5

few siblings

many allergies

1

2

3

4

5

no allergies
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Appendix H
Possible Selves
Directions. Most people can imagine themselves in the future in a variety
of ways. Some of these future "possible selves" are hoped-for, some are
expected, and some are feared.
I would like to know about the possible selves you imagine for yourself.
Please complete the statements below.
a. My three HOPED-FOR possible selves are

(1)
(2 )
(3)
b. My three FEARED possible selves are

(1)
(2)
(3)
c. My three EXPECTED possible selves are
( 1)

(2)
(3)
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Appendix I
Mood Adjective Check List
Directions. Each of the following words describes feelings or mood.
Please use the list to describe your feelings at the m om ent you read each
word. Decide whether each word describes your feeling at the moment and
circle the appropriate symbol.
Use the following key for the symbols to the right of each word:
w = this word definitely describes my feelings now
v = this word slightly describes my feelings now
? = I’m not sure/l can’t decide
no = this word definitely do esn’t describe my feelings
now
Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please mark all words. This should
take only a few minutes.

clutched up

vv

V

?

no

carefree

vv

V

?

no

elated

vv

V

?

no

drowsy

vv

V

?

no

regretful

vv

V

?

no

active

vv

V

?

no

fearful

vv

V

?

no

sad

vv

V

?

no

dull

vv

V

?

no

energetic

vv

V

?

no

boastful

vv

V

?

no
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overjoyed

vv

V

?

no

sluggish

vv

V

?

no

jittery

vv

V

?

no

witty

vv

V

?

no

tired

vv

V

?

no

lively

vv

V

?

no

pleased

vv

V

?

no

vigorous

vv

V

?

no

sorry

vv

V

?

no

refreshed

vv

V

?

no

talkative

vv

V

?

no

